Saudi Arabia's mandate for foreign firms to establish regional headquarters in the kingdom to qualify for government contracts is now in effect, with exceptions for contracts under 1 million riyals, those executed outside Saudi Arabia, deals with sole providers, and emergencies requiring a foreign company without a regional base. Companies can still compete for tenders but must be technically superior and 25% cheaper than the next best offer or have no competition. The Saudi cabinet approved contracting regulations without detailing the number of sub-1 million riyal contracts a foreign firm could sign. Tax incentives were announced shortly before the deadline, and 180 companies have agreed to establish headquarters in Riyadh, as part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's efforts to diversify the economy away from oil and compete with the UAE for foreign investment.

The National Resistance Museum in Western Sahara documents the ongoing 50-year conflict between the Sahrawi people and Morocco. The museum showcases captured Moroccan weapons and serves as a testament to the Sahrawi struggle for independence. The Sahrawis, indigenous to the region, face Moroccan occupation of 80% of their territory, with the remaining 20% controlled by the Polisario Front. Despite a nonbinding International Court of Justice ruling favoring a referendum for Sahrawi self-determination, Morocco has fortified its presence with a 1,700-mile sand wall and continues to relocate Moroccans to the area. The Polisario Front, which began as an independence movement against Spanish colonialism, has been fighting for control since 1973. The conflict has seen shifts in power, with Morocco building defensive walls in the 1980s and a ceasefire in 1991 that has since ended. The museum not only preserves the history of the conflict but also collects evidence of the current war, including recent drone strikes by Morocco, which remains unrecognized by the Moroccan government.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition in the Red Sea, aimed at protecting shipping from Yemen's Houthi group. Despite its military capabilities and the war against the Houthis, Saudi Arabia's main concern is not to undermine its long-term goals of detente with Iran and peace in Yemen. The Houthis have been targeting Red Sea shipping in response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza, affecting global trade and threatening to involve U.S. naval vessels. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seeking to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Both countries are reorienting their regional policy, including establishing ties with Israel and settling rivalries with Iran. The recent detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the UAE's diplomatic relations with Israel, are significant steps in this process. However, the conflict in Gaza has strained these relationships and complicated the regional strategy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's absence from the coalition may also reflect their need for security in the Red Sea and reliance on the U.S. security umbrella.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea is attributed to its strategic goal of detente with Iran and ending the war in Yemen. Despite having a U.S.-equipped military and being affected by Houthi attacks, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are avoiding participation to not escalate tensions with Iran or jeopardize peace efforts in Yemen. The Houthi group has been targeting Red Sea shipping, complicating global trade and threatening to expand attacks to U.S. naval vessels. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's regional strategy includes building new cities and hosting global events like the 2034 World Cup. The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza has affected Saudi and Emirati relations with Israel and the U.S. Iran, supporting the 'Axis of Resistance' including the Houthis, criticizes any country joining the U.S. coalition. Despite the reluctance, Saudi Arabia's need for Red Sea security and reliance on the U.S. security umbrella persists.

Saudi Arabia's absence from the U.S.-announced naval coalition in the Red Sea is attributed to its strategic goal of ending the war in Yemen and improving relations with Iran. Despite having a U.S.-equipped military and being affected by Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are avoiding participation that could escalate tensions with Iran or jeopardize peace efforts in Yemen. The Houthi group, backed by Iran, has been targeting ships in response to Israel's conflict with Hamas. The regional strategy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE includes building new cities, hosting the 2034 World Cup, and reorienting policy with new partners and settling rivalries. The U.S. remains Saudi Arabia's most important ally, and both countries are part of a U.S.-led maritime force, though the UAE announced its departure.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from a U.S.-announced naval coalition in the Red Sea aimed at protecting shipping from Yemen's Houthi group. Despite its military capabilities and the impact of the Red Sea on its imports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, is avoiding participation to not undermine its long-term goals of ending the war in Yemen and improving relations with Iran. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are a response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza, which has also affected Saudi and Emirati relations with Israel and the U.S. Both Gulf states are seeking to reorient their regional policy, including establishing diplomatic relations with Israel and a detente with Iran. The U.S. remains an important ally to Saudi Arabia, but the kingdom's reluctance to join the Red Sea taskforce reflects its need to balance regional strategy with security needs.

Saudi Arabia is not participating in the new U.S.-led naval coalition in the Red Sea, aiming to protect shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, to avoid undermining its long-term strategic goals. These include ending the war in Yemen, reconciling with Iran, and focusing on domestic development projects like building new cities and hosting the 2034 World Cup. The Houthis have been attacking ships in the Red Sea, which has complicated global trade and threatened U.S. naval vessels. The U.S. has not explicitly stated that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will not join the coalition, and the countries' governments have not commented. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's absence from the coalition is seen as a move to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. Despite differences over Middle East policy, the U.S. remains a crucial ally and military supplier to Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are notably absent from a U.S.-announced naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group. Despite their military capabilities and the impact of the Red Sea on their imports, both countries are avoiding participation to not undermine their long-term regional strategies, which include detente with Iran and resolving the conflict in Yemen. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are a response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza, and while they have complicated global trade, their direct impact on Israel is unclear. The Gulf states' absence from the naval action is seen as a move to prevent escalation with Iran and to maintain peace efforts in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's broader regional strategy involves building new cities, hosting global events like the World Cup, and reorienting their foreign policies, including establishing relations with Israel and settling rivalries with Iran.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition in the Red Sea, aimed at protecting shipping from Yemen's Houthi group. Despite its military capabilities and the impact of the Red Sea on its imports, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE, is focusing on a long-term strategy to end the war in Yemen and improve relations with Iran. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels are in response to Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza. The regional strategy also includes Saudi Arabia's ambition to host the 2034 World Cup and build new cities. The U.S. remains a key ally and military supplier to Saudi Arabia, despite their absence from the coalition.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its war on the Houthis and reliance on Red Sea ports. The absence is attributed to Saudi and UAE desires to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels follow Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are reorienting their regional policy, including a detente with Iran and, for the UAE, normalized relations with Israel. The recent conflict has affected Saudi-Israeli normalization talks and Emirati ties with Israel. Iran, denying support for the Houthis, criticizes the Red Sea coalition. Despite the absence, the U.S. remains a key ally to Saudi Arabia, which may still play a behind-the-scenes role in Red Sea security.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from a U.S.-announced naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports. This absence is attributed to Saudi Arabia's strategic goal to disengage from the Yemen war and improve relations with Iran, the Houthis' main supporter. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels have complicated global trade and raised tensions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seeking to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and jeopardizing peace efforts in Yemen. The article also discusses the broader regional strategy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including their desire to focus on domestic development and global affairs, as well as the impact of the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza on their relations with Israel and the U.S.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition aimed at protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its military capabilities and reliance on Red Sea ports. The kingdom's reluctance stems from a desire to not undermine its long-term goals of ending the war in Yemen and improving relations with Iran. The Houthis have been targeting ships in the Red Sea, which has impacted global trade and threatened to involve U.S. naval vessels. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are focusing on regional strategies, including a detente with Iran and peace with the Houthis, while managing their reputations and security concerns. The U.S. remains an important ally and military supplier to Saudi Arabia, which may suggest a behind-the-scenes role in Red Sea security.

Saudi Arabia is notably absent from the U.S.-announced naval coalition protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group, despite its war on the Houthis and reliance on Red Sea ports. The absence is attributed to Saudi Arabia's strategic goal to disengage from the Yemen war and improve relations with Iran. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and threats to U.S. naval vessels have complicated global trade and raised tensions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's regional strategy includes building new cities, hosting the 2034 World Cup, and reorienting policy with new partners, including Israel. The recent war in Gaza has affected these plans, chilling Emirati ties with Israel and derailing Saudi-Israeli talks. Despite the reluctance to join the U.S. taskforce, Saudi Arabia's need for Red Sea security and reliance on the U.S. security umbrella persists.

Lucid Group has assembled almost 800 cars at its Saudi Arabian factory, focusing on training over 200 local employees. The factory, Lucid's first outside the U.S., has an initial capacity of 5,000 EVs annually, supported by a Saudi government pledge to purchase up to 100,000 vehicles over 10 years. The Saudi Public Investment Fund, owning over 60% of Lucid, has invested billions in the company. Lucid has reported accumulated losses of $9.5 billion as of September. The company is preparing staff for a complete build unit factory set to open in 2026, with construction underway. The opening of the new factory depends on supply chains and workforce development.

The article discusses the aftermath of a tragic boat sinking off the coast of Rashid, Egypt, which resulted in over 200 deaths. The boat was carrying migrants of various nationalities, including Egyptians, and the incident has highlighted the desperation of many young Egyptians trying to leave the country due to unemployment and poor living conditions. The local response to the disaster was primarily from fishermen, as the state's response was criticized for being almost non-existent. Survivors faced detention by police, and the UNHCR intervened to expedite the recognition of survivors as refugees. The article also touches on the broader issues of chronic unemployment, infrastructure problems, and the increasing number of Egyptians, particularly minors, attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Italy. Despite the risks, many young people still see Europe as their only chance for a better life, a sentiment echoed by the community organizer Walid Abdel Khalek.

Zeit Zatoun is a kitchen in Cairo founded by Tamara al-Rifai, which employs seven Syrian refugee women. The kitchen, which launched during Ramadan, has been busy with orders, serving dishes based on Rifai's family recipes. Rifai, a communications and advocacy specialist, started the initiative after meeting women at an Obour refugee center. The business aims to be sustainable through the quality of its food rather than relying on charity. It has faced challenges in balancing the community feel with professional discipline. Rifai plans to expand the menu seasonally and emphasizes the importance of presentation in Syrian cuisine. The article also touches on the broader aspects of Syrian and Levantine cuisine, highlighting the importance of fresh ingredients and the variety of dishes.

An Oromo asylum seeker died in Cairo after trying to help during a protest where two men set themselves on fire outside the UNHCR office. The protest was against the alleged discrimination of Oromo refugees by the UNHCR. The Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group, have faced a violent crackdown from the Ethiopian government, leading to deaths, injuries, and arrests. The UNHCR expressed regret over the incident but did not address the protest's cause. Oromo journalist Mohamed Ademo criticized the UNHCR's response, and Oromo community leaders claim widespread rejection of their refugee applications. They allege discrimination, particularly due to connections with the Oromo Liberation Front, labeled a terrorist group by Ethiopia. The UNHCR denies discrimination, attributing delays to individual case assessments and resource constraints. However, some sources suggest Syrian refugees receive priority due to funding and resource allocation, leading to despair among Oromo refugees, some of whom have died attempting to reach Europe.

The article discusses the alarming number of death sentences in Egypt, with over 1,000 people sentenced between 2014 and 2015. It highlights the mass death penalties issued by the Minya Criminal Court and the multiple sentences against Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie. The article notes that due to opaque court processes, only about half of these sentences have been upheld. Mada Masr, the source of the article, provides an infograph detailing the life cycle of a death sentence in Egypt and analyzes the spike in capital punishment since 2011. The research includes data from Cornell University Law School, Amnesty International's annual report, and Human Rights Watch, as well as Mada Masr's own archives.

The article discusses the Egyptian government's crackdown on the LGBT community following the release of a video that was interpreted as a gay marriage. Eight men were sentenced to three years in prison under a law criminalizing 'debauchery.' The article highlights the use of this law and other anti-pornography provisions to target LGBT individuals, often without substantial evidence. It also covers the invasive and criticized forensic anal exams conducted on arrested gay men. Activists like Scott Long and Ramy Youssef argue that these crackdowns are politically motivated to appease conservative factions and distract from other issues. The article mentions the use of technology by the government to surveil social media and warns LGBT individuals to be cautious. Despite the risks, Youssef and others continue to advocate for the LGBT community in Egypt, planning to publish a booklet of stories and dreaming of establishing a safe house for LGBT individuals.

The article discusses the crackdown on transgender women in Egypt, highlighting the arrests and mistreatment they face. Aisha, a transgender woman, was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison under Egypt's debauchery laws. The article notes that over 150 transgender individuals have been targeted since 2014. Activists like Scott Long and Yara, as well as Dalia Abdel Hameed from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, provide insights into the challenges faced by the transgender community, including discrimination, health risks from unsupervised hormone use, and the difficulty of changing legal identity. The article also touches on the history of transgender identity in Egypt and the societal attitudes towards it. Despite the hardships, some prison guards have shown sympathy, recognizing transgender identity as a medical condition rather than a choice. The article concludes with personal accounts of transgender women contemplating leaving Egypt for more accepting societies.