China's role in international conflict resolution, particularly in the context of the Ukraine war, is characterized more as a facilitator of dialogue rather than a mediator with substantive contributions. Despite high-profile claims, China avoids making concrete proposals or applying pressure during negotiations, adhering to its non-interference principle. Observers should temper expectations regarding China's capacity to influence Russia in the Ukraine conflict, as China's approach to peace is organic and non-coercive. The likelihood of China mediating in Ukraine is contingent on Russia's invitation and a clear understanding of the parties' negotiation positions, which are currently opaque.

China's policy in the Middle East, particularly regarding the Houthis' attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes, is influenced by its desire to avoid confrontation with the United States. The Houthis have assured that Chinese and Russian ships will not be targeted as long as they are not associated with Israel. Despite this, China's economic interests are impacted, exemplified by COSCO suspending all shipping to Israel due to security concerns.

On January 13, 2024, Taiwan will hold presidential and parliamentary elections under increasing pressure from China, which claims the island as its territory. The Chinese Communist Party is actively working to discredit the ruling Democratic Progressive Party in favor of the opposition Kuomintang, which advocates for friendlier relations with China.

China has adopted a contradictory stance in the recent Israel-Hamas conflict, condemning attacks against civilians but not attributing blame to any party. While Beijing has shown sympathy towards Israel without criticizing Hamas, it has also expressed support for Palestine and the people of Gaza without condemning Israel. The Chinese government's references do not mention Hamas by name.

China's policy in the Middle East is influenced by its strategic competition with the US, adhering to a principle of no cooperation, support, or confrontation. Despite the economic risks posed by Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes, China avoids direct involvement, preferring diplomatic pressure on Iran and maintaining a delicate balance between regional powers. The article underscores China's reluctance to join the US-led coalition against the Houthis, emphasizing the broader geopolitical implications and China's strategic interests in the region.

China's President Xi Jinping, after a decade in office, is facing challenges from the economic impact of COVID-19 lockdowns and the Ukraine war. Beijing has initiated a charm offensive to stabilize relations and aid economic recovery. Despite this, Xi's long-term goals remain unchanged, aiming to enhance China's global role and influence international norms. Last year's tensions with the US intensified, and China's alignment with Russia was tested by the Ukraine invasion. Domestic hardships and a budget deficit have limited China's foreign policy tools, reducing overseas spending and investment in Africa. Xi's efforts to improve relations with the West include increased diplomatic budgets and high-profile meetings. However, the US maintains a strong bipartisan stance on China as a strategic challenge, and without significant changes, conflicts of interest persist. The US should capitalize on China's current difficulties to strengthen its position in the great power competition.

Semiconducting single-walled carbon nanotubes (s-SWCNTs) with large diameters are desirable for high-performance optoelectronic devices. This study presents the use of a conjugated polymer, regioregular poly-(3-dodecylthiophene) (rr-P3DDT), to selectively separate large-diameter s-SWCNTs. The separated s-SWCNTs, with a diameter of ~1.9 nm, were used to construct thin-film transistors (TFTs) that demonstrated high charge-carrier mobilities and on/off ratios. The research was funded by various Chinese science foundations and conducted by authors affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and related research institutes.

A randomized clinical trial conducted at eight fertility centers in China, involving 715 women with recurrent implantation failure (RIF) undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF), found that 10 mg of prednisone did not significantly improve live birth rates compared to placebo. The study, which ran from November 2018 to August 2021, also suggested that prednisone may increase the risk of preterm delivery and biochemical pregnancy loss. The findings challenge the routine use of prednisone for RIF treatment in clinical practice.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's visit to Beijing highlighted the lack of substantial economic agreements between China and Iran, despite previous promises of a $400 billion investment. China's cautious approach is influenced by international pressure, its critical view of Iran's policies, and the uncertain future of the JCPOA. While China values Iran as a strategic partner against American dominance, it has prioritized improving ties with the US and GCC states. China's trade and investment in the GCC far outweigh its economic engagement with Iran. Raisi's visit, including receiving an honorary title at Peking University, was symbolic but failed to secure the investments needed for Iran's economy.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's state visit to Beijing focused on the Iran nuclear deal and economic relations, but yielded few concrete economic agreements, despite a prior $400 billion investment pledge from China. China's cautious approach is influenced by international pressure over its ties to Russia, a desire to balance Middle Eastern relations, and uncertainties surrounding the JCPOA. While China values Iran as a strategic partner against American dominance, it prioritizes relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council for pragmatic reasons. China's trade and investment in the GCC far outweigh its economic engagement with Iran, and the 25-year agreement with Iran lacks substance. Raisi's visit, including an honorary title from Peking University, was symbolic but did not result in the investments needed for Iran's economy.

The article discusses the potential for the U.S. to leverage China's discomfort with Russia's war in Ukraine to foster U.S.-China cooperation. Despite China's rhetorical support for Russia, it has abstained from UN votes condemning Russia and expressed concerns about the war. China's interests are increasingly divergent from Moscow's, particularly due to the economic impact of the war and the strain on China's diplomatic relations with the West. The U.S. is criticized for not recognizing the nuanced differences between Chinese and Russian interests, which could be exploited to distance Beijing from Moscow. The article suggests that the U.S. should explore Sino-Russian tensions and engage China in dialogue on Ukraine, including the nuclear threat and post-conflict reconstruction, rather than solely relying on public condemnation and moral rhetoric.

China is leveraging the situation in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal to demonstrate its model of stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction. Despite not officially recognizing the Taliban-led government, China is ready to engage with Kabul and has rallied regional support for Afghanistan's future. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi has outlined conditions for full diplomatic recognition of the Taliban, emphasizing the need for national reconciliation and combating terrorism. A recent agreement with regional countries includes 72 development commitments for Afghanistan, although timelines are unclear. China supports its enterprises investing in Afghanistan, including resuming projects like the Aynak copper mine and the Amu Darya oilfield. Beijing's engagement, driven by a desire to provide a positive example of its approach to economic reconstruction, is expected to increase if Afghanistan remains stable.

The Ukraine war has accelerated the alignment between China and key Middle Eastern states, driven by shared frustrations with the United States. Voting patterns at the United Nations reveal this convergence, with China and several Middle Eastern countries often abstaining or voting against resolutions condemning Russia. The US-Saudi relationship is strained, partly due to human-rights concerns, leading Saudi Arabia to consider economic deals with China, such as trading oil in renminbi. China's engagement in the Middle East has increased through diplomatic visits and vaccine diplomacy, positioning Beijing to potentially fill a power vacuum as the US focuses on other regions.

The article by Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, provides an in-depth analysis of the complex Sino-Russian relationship, challenging the assumption that China supports Russia's actions in Ukraine. It explores the paradoxical nature of their partnership, driven by shared anti-U.S. sentiment and leadership preferences, yet marked by fundamental differences in their visions for the international order. The analysis draws on private roundtables, conversations with Chinese strategists, and academic research to reveal that while China and Russia are aligned against the United States, their cooperation is limited and vulnerable to shifts in U.S. policy. The article also highlights Xi Jinping's personal affinity for Russia and Putin, which influences China's strategic alignment, despite the risks and historical lessons of Russian opportunism.